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Limited Liability, Asymmetric Taxation, and Risk Taking  
– Why Partial Tax Neutralities Can Be Harmful – 
 
1. Introduction 
Liability-related issues are often regarded as one of the main reasons for the current financial 
crises. As an example, mortgage debtors in the U.S. who give real estate as a security for a 
loan can get rid of the mortgage if they hand over the real estate to the lender, even if the 
current value falls short of the nominal debt. As a result, mortgage debtors can be held liable 
only to a limited extent. Banks which “securitize” loans and do not retain a fraction of these 
securities for their own account are another example of limited liability. In the case of default, 
these banks do not suffer losses although they impose substantial risks on their trading 
partners. The trading behaviour of investment banks − which are typically subject to limited 
liability − has been described by the metaphor “picking up nickels in front of a steamroller”. 
Obviously, limited liability provides additional incentives for risk taking by creating a convex 
cash flow structure. 
The treatment of losses is closely related to liability issues. If investors take risks and 
conditions turn sufficiently unfavourable, losses may occur. Then the question arises to what 
extent these losses can be used for tax purposes. Current tax systems are characterized by 
loss-offset limitations, creating concavities in the after-tax cash flow structures. 
Rational investors can anticipate limited liability as well as loss-offset restrictions when 
making their decision on the amount of risk they want to bear. Thus, investors are facing a 
combination of tax- and non-tax asymmetries of the cash flows. On an ex ante basis, it is not 
clear which combined incentives are induced by these multiple asymmetries on risk taking. 
In Business Taxation, it is often argued that taxation should be neutral with respect to a firm’s 
legal form. Proponents of legal-form-tax-neutrality point out that every taxpayer should be 
taxed considering the financial results of its economic activity
1. This requires a uniform 
taxation regardless of a firm’s legal form. Since different legal forms face different liability 
rules, it remains an open question which risk taking incentives are induced by an equal tax 
treatment of losses incurred by firms of different legal forms. Moreover, we ask whether 
legal-form-tax-neutrality is compatible with tax neutrality regarding risk taking. More 
generally, we analyze whether different partial tax neutralities are congruent or conflicting tax 
policy objectives. 
We consider a risky investment with a risk level to be chosen by the investor. We assume that 
there is an individually optimal risk level in a world without taxation under full liability. This 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Siegel (2004). Unlike the principles-based proponents of legal-form-tax-neutrality, business 
economists have recently been questioning the economic meaningfulness of legal-form-tax-neutrality. See 
Wagner (2006) and the references cited there.   3
symmetric case serves as the reference case for the effects of tax- and non-tax asymmetries. 
We show that proportional income taxation with loss-offset limitations reduces the optimal 
risk level. By contrast, limited liability – as a parameter reflecting a firm’s legal form – 
enhances the incentives for taking risk. The final decision about the risk level is affected by a 
combination of loss-offset restrictions, the degree of limited liability, and the tax rate. 
Our results indicate that risk-taking-tax-neutrality is not compatible with legal-form-tax-
neutrality. Risk-taking-tax-neutrality requires asymmetric taxation under limited liability and 
symmetric taxation under full liability. Thus, we show that partial tax neutralities do not 
necessarily provide guidance to overall tax neutrality. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a review of the tax literature on risk taking 
and limited liability. Section 3 illustrates the structure of our model. Furthermore, we examine 
the incentive effects induced by asymmetric taxation and limited liability. Section 4 analyzes 
conditions for risk-taking-tax-neutrality. The results are illustrated with some numerical 
examples in section 5. Section 6 summarizes the results and provides a critical discussion of 
the model assumptions. We conclude with a perspective on further research questions. 
 
2. Literature  review 
The tax impact on risk taking has been a focal issue of public finance and business tax 
research for decades. In their seminal paper, Domar / Musgrave (1944) prove that risk taking 
strongly depends on loss-offset rules. Improving loss-offset opportunities results in higher risk 
taking. Mossin (1968) generalizes the Domar / Musgrave results by means of expected utility 
theory. Näslund (1968) uses mathematical optimisation and Russell  /  Smith (1970) use 
criteria of stochastic dominance in their analyses of taxes and risk taking. Richter (1960), 
Stiglitz (1969), Allingham (1972) and Sandmo (1989) also use the risk-utility-theory to 
analyze the impact of taxation with and without loss-offset on the demand for risky 
investments
2. These articles can be attributed to the public finance literature. Research in 
business taxation gained similar insights
3. 
In the following decades, asymmetric taxation was examined intensively. Important 
contributions to the public finance literature in this area were Barlev / Levy (1975), Auerbach 
(1986), Auerbach / Poterba (1987), MacKie-Mason (1990), Eeckhoudt / Gollier / Schlesinger 
(1997), van Wijnbergen / Estache (1999) and Panteghini (2001a, 2001b, 2005). The empirical 
relevance of loss-offset regulations is clarified by Altshuler / Auerbach (1990), Mintz (1988) 
as well as by Shevlin (1990). Their results are examined using effective tax rates. 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive literature review on risk taking and taxation see Niemann / Sureth (2008). The relevance 
of taxation in the current financial crisis is explained by Shaviro (2009) and Hemmelgarn / Nicodème (2010). 
3 See Schneider (1980). Eeckhoudt / Hansen (1982) derive conditions which increase demand for risky assets 
under more restrictive loss-offset rules.   4
Real-world loss-offset regulations often induce a path dependence of investment decisions. 
Thus, in many cases analytical results for investment models cannot be obtained. Therefore, 
numerical methods are necessary for the assessment of investment projects. Numerical 
simulations were realized by Majd / Myers (1986) and Majd / Myers (1987). Since the 1970s 
Monte-Carlo-simulations have been used for the evaluation of loss-offset limitations in the 
German literature
4. 
The analysis of loss-offset regulations is not restricted to public finance research. The 
regulations are examined in the finance literature as well. For example, Ball / Bowers (1982), 
Cooper / Franks  (1983),  Majd / Myers  (1986), Majd  /  Myers (1987), Schnabel  /  Roumi 
(1990), and Lund (2000) emphasize parallels between a call option and the treasury’s tax 
claim. 
Since the 1940s neutral tax systems under certainty have been derived by Brown (1948), 
Preinreich (1951), Samuelson (1964) and Johansson (1969), for instance. Neutral tax systems 
under uncertainty were proved later by Hartman (1978), Fane (1987), Buchholz (1988), 
Bond / Devereux (1995). Under risk neutrality, such neutral tax systems have already been 
derived in a real option context by Sureth (2002), and Niemann / Sureth (2005) as well as 
under risk aversion by Niemann / Sureth (2004). 
Neutral tax systems mainly require a proportional tax rate and symmetric taxation of profits 
and losses. Loss-offset limitations induce violations of tax neutrality. Moreover, most models 
of capital budgeting with taxes implicitly assume that investments are carried out by 
individuals rather than corporations, because these models consider only one taxpayer rather 
than a combination of individual and corporate taxation. The taxation of partnerships in many 
countries corresponds to this assumption. By contrast, a comprehensive analysis of tax effects 
in corporations requires the integration of individual and corporate taxation as well as 
assumptions about the profit situation and corporate dividend policy. 
Different liability laws restrict comparability of partnerships and corporations
5. Partners are 
directly liable for debts of partnerships whereas shareholders cannot be held liable for debts of 
their corporation. Thus, limited liability generates asymmetric cash flow structures: Corporate 
cash flows can be transferred to shareholders approximately proportionally. By contrast, 
corporate losses do not generate equivalent payment obligations for shareholders. 
Because of its practical relevance limited liability has been examined in law and economics 
for a long time. These analyses especially focus on the relationship between shareholders and 
creditors of corporations. Obviously, risk neutral decision makers with limited liability prefer 
risky investments. Sinn (1980) and Golbe (1988) show that these results are particularly 
relevant for companies close to default (“gamble for resurrection”). Gollier / Koehl / Rochet 
                                                 
4 See Haegert / Kramm (1977), Niemann (2004), and Dahle / Sureth (2008). 
5  For a historical overview of the international development of corporate law see 
Guinnane / Harris / Lamoreaux / Rosenthal (2007).   5
(1997) prove that limited liability increases the level of individually optimal risk taking. 
However, risk-averse investors with limited liability generally do not choose the highest 
possible risk level. 
Jensen / Meckling (1976) examine the effects of limited liability on agency costs and capital 
structure
6. Rose-Ackerman (1991) argues that corporate managers prefer very secure 
investments in order to minimize the probability of insolvency. By contrast, there also exist 
incentives for excessive risk taking. Risky investments offer the opportunity of receiving 
positive results without being held responsible for negative results. 
Limited liability and its effects on the banking sector were already examined before the 
current financial crisis
7. In connection with the Asian banking crisis, Sinn (2003) illustrates 
effects of limited liability and asymmetric information. He shows that investment banks have 
an incentive to invest excessively in risky investments and not to generate enough equity. 
Tax payments have not been analyzed in these papers. However, Meade (1978) discusses the 
correlation between corporate taxation and limited liability. He argues that limited liability is 
a special benefit of corporations, which should be taxed. By contrast, Musgrave / Musgrave 
(1973) state that limited liability does not imply substantial social costs. Therefore, it should 
not be taxed. John  /  Nair  /  Senbet (2005) show that limited liability can lead to 
overinvestment. In their model, a corporate tax can contribute to reducing conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and other stakeholders. As a result, a corporation tax must be regarded 
as the price of limited liability. 
Becker / Fuest (2007) illustrate in a two-state-model that a corporate tax can be justified by 
the existence of limited liability
8. In contrast to John / Nair / Senbet (2005), they identify the 
corporate tax as a corrective to capital market failure under asymmetric information. In their 
study, they derive a socially optimal extra burden on corporations. Another rarely examined 
aspect is the interaction between corporate law and / or contractual limited liability and tax 
loss-offset. In their model, Becker / Fuest (2007) distinguish between companies with full 
loss-offset and companies with restricted loss-offset.  
The impact of taxation on the decision between insolvency and merger with solvent 
companies is analyzed by Bulow / Shoven (1978). They show that asymmetric taxation favors 
mergers. The reason is that loss carry-forwards are lost in the case of insolvency or 
liquidation. By contrast, taxation of highly positive profits induces the opposite effect and 
tends to favor insolvency or liquidation. 
                                                 
6 For incentive problems under limited liability see for instance Palomino / Prat (2003), Budde / Kräkel (2008), 
Malcomson (2009). For incentive problems under limited liability and taxation see Banerjee / Besley (1990). 
7 For limited liability and risk taking in banking see, for example, Esty (1998), Grossman (2001). 
8 See Miglo (2007) for a slightly modified version of the model.   6
In this paper we examine the simultaneous effects of tax- and non-tax asymmetries in the 
investment’s cash flow structure on the individually optimal risk level. We derive a 
substitutional relationship of limited liability and loss offset restrictions. 
 
3.  Model design  
3.1 Benchmark  situation:  Tax-free case with full liability 
We consider a one-period model with a risk-neutral investor. The investor has an initial 
wealth denoted by I. He puts his entire initial wealth in an investment project with a risk level 
to be chosen. The project's expected rate of return v depends on the chosen risk level r: 
() vv r ≡ . In addition, the realized rate of return is a function of the stochastic variable ε %. 
Assuming a sufficiently well-behaved risk-return function v, there is an individually optimal 
risk level 
∗ r  in the tax-free case with full liability: 
() () () ( ) ( ) ( ) () with 0 , 0, 0, 0, 0 r v r r v z v r rv rv r rv r με
∗∗ ∗ ′′ ′′ ′ =+ = < > = > < < % % .  
If r = 0, the rate of return v(r) corresponds to the risk-free interest rate z. Increasing r initially 
leads to an increased expected rate of return. The expected rate of return reaches its unique 
maximum at r*. Subsequently, the expected rate of return decreases
9. The risk level r can be 
varied continuously. The stochastic variable ε % is distributed over the interval [ ] , ε ε  with 
0, 0 ε ε <> . Its probability density function is denoted by  ( ) f ε . The expected value of the 
stochastic variable is zero:  [] () 0 fd
ε
ε
εε ε ε Ε= = ∫ % . 
We assume that the investor is fully liable for payment obligations resulting from the 
investment. This means that he faces a reserve liability if the rate of return falls short of  





<− . Examples for this setting are investments in sole proprietorships 
or in partnerships. Partners have full liability for the partnership’s payment obligations. 
Using the above definitions, the investor's expected future value W in our reference case can 
be easily computed as: 





=+ + =+ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∫  
Obviously, the expected future value is maximized if  () vr is maximized. Thus, r
∗ represents 
the investor's optimal risk level in the symmetric benchmark situation. 
                                                 
9 Assuming that increasing risk requires additional effort by the investor, this effect can be interpreted as a result 
of the investor's increasing and convex disutility associated with higher effort induced by higher risk.   7
3.2  Symmetric taxation with full liability 
We use a uniform tax rate s for all kinds of capital income. The rate of return μ %  is subject to 
the same tax rate, regardless of the chosen risk level. Tax-exempt income and non-deductible 
expenses do not exist. Therefore, tax base and tax rate effects cannot occur under symmetric 
taxation. 
Symmetric taxation does not alter the individually optimal risk taking r
*, because a 
multiplication by the factor (1 ) s −  does not change the optimality properties of the expected 
rate of return. Hence, symmetric taxation does not distort risk taking if the investor is risk 
neutral
10. This effect can be easily verified by computing the expected future value after 
symmetric taxation: 
() ( ) () () () ( ) () 11 1 1





=+− + =+ − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∫ . 
 
3.3  Asymmetric taxation with full liability 
We implement a tax-induced asymmetry in the form of a loss-offset limitation. This is the 
first step in a gradual introduction of several asymmetries. Positive profits are subject to the 






με <⇔< − %  only a limited or no tax refund 
applies. This is formally displayed by a loss-offset parameter  1 γ ≤ . This parameter represents 
the proportion of deductible losses. As a result, γ  is regarded as a tax policy variable. By 
adjusting γ , the tax legislator can change investors' willingness to realize risky investments. 
Under asymmetric taxation, the tax base TB is defined as: 
()
(() ) f o r
()









⎧ ⋅⋅ + < − ⎪ ⎪ = ⎨
⎪ ⋅+ ≥ −
⎪ ⎩
 
For  1 γ = , the special case of symmetric taxation emerges. A case of no loss-offset is given by 
0 γ = . Existing tax systems with limited loss carry-backs, non-interest-bearing loss carry-
forwards or different types of minimum taxation are characterized by 01 γ << . Stricter loss-
offset rules (in terms of decreasing the investor's wealth) correspond with a reduction of γ
11. 
                                                 
10 This result is distorted by risk aversion. See Domar / Musgrave (1944). 
11 In most jurisdictions the use of losses for tax purposes depends on the amount of losses. Losses that cannot be 
offset against current profits must be carried forward to subsequent periods, which induces a negative time 
effect. The higher a loss, the later it can be offset against future profits. In our notation, this effect would imply 
that the loss offset parameter γ  would be a function of ε :  ( ) γ γε ≡ . Such a model specification would   8
The relationship of the realisation of the random variable ε  and the investor's future value 




Figure  1:  Future value under symmetric and asymmetric taxation as functions of the 
random variable ε  
The solid line illustrates the future value under symmetric taxation. In the case of loss-offset 





εμ ≥− ⇔ ≥ . Asymmetric taxation concavifies the future value function. Therefore, 
the decision on risk taking is probably influenced by similar effects as the concave utility 
function of a risk-averse decision-maker. 
The expected future value considering asymmetric taxation is given by: 
() ( ) ( )() () ( )
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require extensive assumptions regarding future profits, which are difficult to explain in a one-period model. 
Hence, we assume γ  to be constant. A one-period model does not permit time effects of taxation. As a 
consequence, we have to approximate time effects by tax base effects.   9
() ( ) ( )
() ()
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To determine the optimal risk level under asymmetric taxation  ˆ r , the following first-order 
condition must be met: 
() () ( ) () () ()
() ˆ
ˆ ˆ
ˆˆ 1( 1 ) 0
vr
s r Wr
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It can be shown that the relation  ˆ rr
∗ ≤  applies. Because of v´(r


























* cannot be an optimum. To show that 
* ˆ < rr , we use the second partial derivative of 
s
r W  with respect to r, which is negative: 
() ( ) () ()
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∫
 
Due to our concavity assumption  ( ) 0 vr ′′ < , the first two terms (upper line) are negative. The 
last term (lower line) is negative as well because of: 




(1 ) (1 ) 0.
vr r v r vr vr vr r v r vr
sf v r s f
rr r r r r
γγ
′′ −− ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞
′ −− − = − − − < ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
As a result, asymmetric taxation under full liability decreases the willingness for risk taking. 
It should be noted that this result is still based on the assumption of risk-neutral behaviour. 
   10
3.4  Pre-tax case with limited liability 




<− % , a liability 
exemption implies that a reserve liability as under unlimited liability cannot occur. This 
means that zero is a lower boundary for the investor's future value. Thus, negative future 
values are not possible. With regard to a meaningful analysis of limited liability, we assume 





In the case of partially limited liability, the reserve liability will not be completely removed. 
This variation can be interpreted as an insurance with proportional retention. The 
compensation by the insurance is a fraction of 01 β ≤ ≤  of the “damage”. Equivalently, the 
investor has a proportional retention of ( ) 1 β − . A rate of return before insurance benefits of 
() 1 r μ <− %  is regarded as the “insured event”. This corresponds to a total loss of the investor's 
initial wealth. For  1 = β , there is a liability exemption for the investor. This is typical for 
shareholders of corporations who cannot incur negative future values from their 
shareholdings. For  0 = β , full liability applies. Practically, this can be found by sole 
proprietors or partners in partnerships. 
Within the scope of trade and company law, regulations on liability are at the legislator's 
discretion. Hence, β  can be regarded as the legislator's action variable. In addition, β  can be 
interpreted as a tax policy action variable. 
The conditional future value for a risky investment amounts to: 
1( )
(1 )(1 ( ( ) )) for
1( )














We can graphically illustrate the connection of the random variable ε  and the investor’s 




Figure 2:  Future value under partially limited and unlimited liability as a function of the 
random variable ε  
The solid line displays the future value with unlimited liability. The case of partially limited 





ε . Obviously, limited liability generates a convexity of the future value function. 
Therefore, an incentive for higher risk taking can be expected. 
The explicit formal analysis confirms this conjecture. Now, the expected future value is: 
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The first-order condition for the optimal solution  ˆ r  is: 
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βε ε ε .   12
Because of v´(r
*) = 0, at  the  point r


















βε ε ε  is 
satisfied. As a result, the individually optimal risk level is higher than under full liability: 
* ˆ ≥ rr . 
 
3.5  Symmetric taxation with limited liability 
In the case of limited liability ( 0 > β ) the calculation of the expected future value may differ 
from the pre-tax case. In principle, the following interpretations are possible: 
1.  The tax base is defined as the net change in value  () ⋅ I r μ  taking into account limited 
liability. In the case of a total loss of the initial wealth the treasury would participate 
proportionally under symmetric taxation. This would result in a net future value of  0 > sI , 
which consists of the loss-induced tax reimbursement only. In practice, this is the case if 
investors do not need to provide their loss-induced tax reimbursement to cover the 
liabilities of the corporation. This corresponds to actual tax law for shareholders of 
corporations in most jurisdictions. 
2.  The loss-induced tax reimbursement must be paid to cover losses until the net future value 
equals zero. This is the case for sole proprietors or for partners of partnerships who are 
legally facing an unlimited liability, but whose net wealth might not be sufficient to cover 
all obligations. 
That is the reason why there are two possibilities even under full exemption from liability 
excluding negative future values. There are similar differentiations in the case of partial 
liability  01 << β . Case 1 occurs if the partially limited liability is valid for rates of return 
below  1 ≤− μ . In this case, a positive future value is possible only because of a tax shield. 






Case 1 corresponds to the situation of corporation shareholders and is independent of the 
initial wealth. Case 2 just matches with the situation of partners of partnerships if this 
investment is the investor’s only asset. Otherwise, the other components of the investor’s 
wealth would have to be considered in the calculation, too. However, in this case, the 
character of a partial analysis would be lost. Since we focus on the typical liability rules for 
the different legal forms, we will analyze case 1 only. 
In this case, the future value as a function of μ  is given by
12: 
                                                 
12 In order to avoid a multitude of subscripts and superscripts, the expected future value under symmetric 
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As in the pre-tax case, limited liability increases the incentives for risky investments under 
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The first-order condition for the optimal risk level  ˆ r  is: 
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 holds. Consequently, the optimal risk level 
exceeds the one from the symmetric case again: 
* ˆ ≥ r r . 
The impact of the tax rate on the optimal risk level is negative: 
() () ()
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Hence, the higher the tax rate, the lower the optimal risk level. 
 
3.6  Asymmetric taxation with limited liability 
In this section we combine tax- and non-tax asymmetries. Therefore, the future value is a 
piecewise linear function of the pre-tax return μ  (or the random variable ε , respectively) and 




Figure 3:  Future value under asymmetric taxation and partial limited liability 01 << β  
as function of the random variable ε  
Restricting our analysis to case 1 (limited liability is effective for  1 ≤ − μ ), the conditional 
future values as functions of μ  are: 
()
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The future value will be exactly  sI γ  if the rate of return equals –100%. This future value 
corresponds to the tax shield given a total loss of the initial wealth. For losses exceeding this 
value, the future value depends on the liability parameter β . Furthermore,  sI γ  represents a 
lower boundary for the case of liability exemption ( 1 = β ). Under full liability ( 0 = β ), the 
results correspond to those in section 3.3. 
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Nr vr r f d  as 
defined above, the expected future value can be simplified to: 
() ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 11 1 1 =+ − + − − − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ Wr I s v r s M r s N r γγ β . 
The main trade-offs are obvious and result from the isolated effects of asymmetric taxation 
and limited liability. It depends on M(r) and N(r) and hence on the risk-return function  ( ) vr, 
the probability density function  () f ε , the tax rate s, the loss-offset parameter γ , and the 
liability parameter β , whether the combined asymmetries lead to increased or decreased 
incentives for risk taking. 
 
4. Neutral  tax  systems 
The trade-off between loss-offset limitations and limited liability implies that there should be 
a loss-offset-liability combination that leaves the investor’s risk taking decision unaffected. 
Such a combination is called “neutral with respect to risk taking”. Under a neutral tax system, 
the investor’s individually optimal risk level would coincide with the one in the symmetric 
case. Thus, the neutrality condition is defined by:  ( ) ˆ ,
∗ = rr βγ . 
To meet this neutrality condition, the first-order condition  ( ) 2 /0
∗ ∂ ∂= Wr r  must be fulfilled 
in the presence of asymmetric taxation and limited liability at 
∗ = rr . Using 
() ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 11 1 1 =+ − + − − − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ Wr I s v r s M r s N r γγ β , the neutrality condition can be 
written as: 
( )























′ ⇒− +− −− =
∂∂
∂

















Using the expressions for M(r) and N(r) from section 3.6 yields:   16
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Thus, we can show for an arbitrary tax rate 0<s<1 and a given value Q
*: 
(a) Under unlimited liability taxation has to be symmetric, et vice versa, to ensure risk-taking-
tax-neutrality. 















(b) If liability is at least partially limited, taxation has to be asymmetric to ensure risk-taking-
tax-neutrality. 








































So it follows  01 >⇒< β γ , because only for  1 < γ  can Q take strictly positive values. Since 
Q is strictly decreasing in γ , the neutrality condition can be met for any given value 0 < β ≤ 
1. If the loss-offset parameter is required to take only non-negative values  0 ≥ γ , however, 
this is only true if the tax rate s exceeds the liability parameter β : 
[ )
* (1 )












For 0<≤ s β , it is not guaranteed that the neutrality condition can be met within the range of 
existing loss-offset limitations ( 0 ≥ γ ). Especially for low tax rates ( 0 → s ) or for extensive 
liability limitations ( 1 → β ), the condition for risk-taking-tax-neutrality requires negative 
values 0 < γ . This parameter setting is incompatible with existing loss-offset rules, because it 
demands not only neglecting losses for tax purposes, but even a taxation of losses! 
Our results indicate that the request for legal-form-tax-neutrality may be misleading as far as 
risk allocation is concerned. Under full liability, symmetric taxation is a necessary condition 
for tax neutrality with respect to risk taking. This result is intuitive, because under full 
liability, the investor participates equally in positive and negative returns. Only symmetric 
taxation keeps the resulting risk-return incentives intact.  
For limited liability firms, in contrast, asymmetric taxation is necessary to maintain risk 
choice undistorted. The economic reason is given by the opposing effects of limited liability 
and loss-offset restrictions. Whereas limited liability increases the demand for risky 
investment, loss-offset limitations decrease investors’ willingness to invest in risky projects. 
For any given liability parameter β , there exists a unique loss-offset parameter γ  which 
leaves risk taking undistorted compared to the symmetric case. As a consequence, if both 
policy action variables β  and γ  are variable, there is an infinite number of neutral  − β γ  
combinations for each given set of tax rates s and ratios 
∗ Q . 
From a tax policy perspective, it is problematic that every neutral  − β γ  combination depends 
on the ratio 
∗ Q , which must be determined individually for each risk-return function  ( ) vr and 
each distribution of returns  ( ) f ε . Although a neutral loss-offset parameter γ  does exist for 
any given tax rate s and any given liability parameter β , it ensures neutrality only for an   18
individual case rather than for a general setting. For other risk-return functions and other 
distributions of returns, the supposedly neutral  − β γ  combination will distort risk taking. 
In any case, our results refute the proponents of legal-form-tax-neutrality. Our model clearly 
proves that firms with different liability parameters, i.e., incorporated and non-incorporated 
firms, must be subject to differential taxation if risk-taking-tax-neutrality is used as a tax 
policy objective. More generally, our model reveals an example of opposing partial tax 
neutralities. 
 
5. Numerical  examples 
5.1. Tax  effects 
This section explains the effects of tax- and non-tax asymmetries using a simple distribution 
of the rates of return. Since the uniform distribution is probably the simplest continuous 
distribution function, it is adequate to illustrate the emerging effects. The probability density 
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We need a symmetric distribution, because the expected value of the stochastic term should 





0o t h e r w i s e .




ε ε  
For the following numerical examples we use a quadratic risk-return function: 
2 () =+ + vr z a r b r with  0 z ≥  as the risk-free interest rate. In order to meet the properties 
() ( ) 0, 0, vr r vr
∗∗ ′′ <> =   () ( ) 0, 0 vr r vr
∗ ′′ ′ >< < , we need coefficients  0, 0 ab >< . The 
individually optimal risk level in the symmetric case is given by the unique root of  () vr, 
which maximizes the expected future value  [ ] 1( ) =⋅+ WI v r : 
2 !
** () 2 0 0 ( ) 0
24
′ =+ = ⇒ = − > ⇒ =− >
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Thus, the expected rate of return in the optimum is strictly positive. 
Assuming a uniform distribution yields the following auxiliary variables M and N and their 
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so that the expected future value can be written as 
[ ] 2
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Basically, this expression seems to have a rather simple polynomial form, which should be 
easily optimized. However, although the roots of 




γγ β  can 
be determined analytically, they are very complicated and cannot be interpreted in an 
economically meaningful way. 
Numerical examples illustrate the substitution effect of limited liability and loss-offset 
restrictions derived above. We use the following assumptions: 
•  Tax rate: s=25% 
•  Risk-return function: 
22 ( ) 0.1 0.5 0.3 vr z a r b r r r =+ + = + − , i.e., the risk-free interest is 
10%  
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with  10 =− ε   
A moderate loss-offset restriction with γ =0.8 induces the following relationship between the 
investor’s optimal risk level r and the expected future value. Our reference case is defined by 
full liability under symmetric taxation ( 0, 1 = = βγ ; solid line). In addition, three versions 
with partially limited liability (01 << β ) are shown as well (thick dashed line: β = 0.1; 
medium dashed line: β =0.2; thin dashed line: β =0.3):   20











Figure 4: Expected future values as functions of the chosen risk level r 
As has been formally shown above, the individually optimal risk level  ˆ r  increases with 
increasing liability limit β . 
Even moderate liability limits (for example, β =0.3) induce rather high optimal risk levels 
which would cause negative returns if the investor was facing full liability (for example, r > 
1.8471). The optimal risk levels associated with figure 4 are: 
Liability- and loss-offset parameters  Optimal risk level  ˆ r  
01 == βγ   0.8333 (reference case) 
0.1 0.8 βγ ==   0.9949 
0.2 0.8 βγ ==   1.4811 
0.3 0.8 βγ ==   2.0294 
Table 1:  Optimal risk levels depending on liability- and loss-offset parameters 
Figure 4 clarifies that limited liability may generate substantial increases in expected future 
value compared to full liability. By contrast, the impact of tighter loss-offset limitations is 
rather small. As shown above, for lower values of γ  the investor chooses a lower risk level. 
However, the general effects are confirmed for other parameter settings (for 
example, 0.6 γ = ). Figure 5 displays the expected future value for  0, 1 βγ = =  (solid line) as 
well as for  0.6; 0.1/0.2/0.3 γβ ==  (thick, medium and thin dashed line):   21











Figure 5: Expected future values as functions of the chosen risk level r 
Now, the investor’s optimal risk levels are: 
Liability- and loss-offset parameters  Optimal risk level  ˆ r  
01 == βγ   0.8333 (reference case) 
0.1 0.6 βγ ==   0.7378 
0.120455 0.6 βγ ==   0.8333 
0.2 0.6 βγ ==   1.2268 
0.3 0.6 βγ ==   1.7780 
Table 2:  Optimal risk levels depending on liability- and loss-offset parameters 
Again, this example shows that combinations of β  and γ  could generate lower, higher, or 
constant optimal risk levels compared to the symmetric case. 
For quadratic risk-return functions 
2 () =+ + vr z a r b r, the expected future value is a fourth-
degree polynomial in r. Thus, taking infinite risks could generate economically useless 
infinite values:  2 lim ( )
r Wr
→∞ =± ∞. For this reason, we have to put an exogenously-given upper 
boundary 
max r on the selectable risk level r. We think that this assumption reflects reality 
quite well, because the risk level of real investment cannot be chosen completely arbitrarily. 
Rather, the risk will be within reasonable limits. 
   22
5.2  Neutral Tax systems 
Assuming a quadratic risk-return function 
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There is no analytical solution in this special case. Rather, the neutrality condition is just 
given in implicit form. For this reason, the interaction between limited liability and loss-offset 
restrictions is illustrated by numerical examples. 
The optimal risk level in the symmetric case given the parameters of section 5.1 ( 0.25; s =  
( )
22 ( ) 0.1 0.5 0.3 ; 1/(2 ); 10 vr z a r b r r r f εε ε = + + = + − =− =− ) is 
* 5/6 = r . In this setting 
the 
* β -γ -combinations, which are neutral with respect to risk taking can be displayed 
graphically: 












Figure 6: Neutral β -γ -combinations 
The substitutional relation between loss-offset restrictions and limited liability can be 
confirmed for this functional specification. Moreover, for a sufficiently tight liability limit   23
(for example,  0.25 β ≥ ), risk-taking-tax-neutrality not only requires neglecting losses for tax 
purposes ( 0 γ = ), rather, it would be necessary to tax losses as income ( 0 γ < ). This 
apparently absurd result can be interpreted as follows. The (involuntary) loss incurred by the 
contractual partners of a limited liability investor would be allocated to the investor as taxable 
income. In this sense, negative values  0 < γ  could be interpreted as a fiscal measure against 
moral hazard of limited liability investors. The liability limit prescribed by corporate law 
would be eliminated by tax law. Of course, tax debts would have to be excluded from limited 
liability. 
The broader the range of the possible rates of return (i.e., the lower the values of  0 ε < ) the 
larger are the potential benefits of limited liability. Thus, loss-offset rules have to be more 
restrictive for a higher variability of ε  in order to keep risk-taking-tax-neutrality. This effect 
is clarified under the assumption of  { } 10; 8; 6; 4; 2; 1.57 ε ∈− − − − − −  in the following figure: 












Figure 7: Neutral β -γ -combinations for different ε -values 
The neutral β -γ -combinations are relatively close together for sufficiently high probabilities 
of default ( { } 10; 8; 6; 4 ∈− − − − ε , solid and dashed bottom lines). For lower default 
probabilities and hence low probabilities of a total loss (e.g.,  2 = − ε , thin solid line) the loss-
offset restrictions have to be relaxed. For 01 , 5 7 >≥ − ε  (horizontal dashed line) rates of 
return below −100% cannot occur and limited liability cannot be binding. Hence, the 
neutrality condition is independent of β  and a complete loss-offset must be granted ( 1 = γ ).   24
The tax rate also has a substantial impact on the neutral β -γ -combinations. Low tax rates 
result in low loss-induced tax reimbursements, whereas high tax rates aggravate the relevance 
of loss-offset restrictions. To compensate for the benefits of limited liability, low tax rates 
require a much more severe tax “punishment” of losses than high tax rates. Thus, for low tax 
rates, the risk-taking neutral γ  can be dramatically lower than for high tax rates. This is 
illustrated in figure 8, which shows neutral β -γ -combinations for different tax rates 
{ } 10%,25%,40%,55%,70%,99% ∈ s . The left, thick solid line is valid for  10% = s , the thin, 
dashed line top right for  99% = s , respectively. Since the other parameters are held constant 
(
22 () 0 , 1 0 , 5 0 , 3 ; =+ + = + − vr z a r b r r r   ( ) 1/(2 ); 10 = −= − f εε ε ), our reference case still is 
* 5/6 = r . 












Figure 8: Neutral β -γ -combinations for different tax rates 
As before, the negative slope of the functions indicates the substitutional relationship of 
limited liability and loss-offset restrictions. Furthermore, figure 8 illustrates that neutral β -
γ -combinations may not be available within traditional loss-offset methods characterized by 
01 ≤≤ γ . A higher risk level r increases the probability for default and enhances the 
relevance of limited liability. For a compensation of the resulting benefit to the investor, a 
denial of loss-offset or even a taxation of losses could be necessary. The higher the tax rate, 
the more likely it is that this compensation effect can be achieved within the range of 
traditional loss-offset methods. 
   25
6.  Summary and conclusion 
This paper analyzes the simultaneous incentives arising from asymmetric taxation and limited 
liability on optimal risk taking. We show that loss-offset restrictions reduce incentives for risk 
taking by inducing concavities in the investor’s value function. By contrast, limited liability 
convexifies the investor’s value function and encourages risk taking. The combined effects of 
asymmetric taxation and limited liability depend on the intensity of both components. An 
important result is the fact that risk-taking-tax-neutrality and legal-form-tax-neutrality are 
incompatible: Under full liability, risk-taking-tax-neutrality requires symmetric taxation of 
profits and losses, whereas asymmetric taxation is a necessary condition for risk-taking-tax-
neutrality under limited liability. 
Again, these results reveal that legal-form-tax-neutrality – if defined simply as equal tax 
treatment of different legal forms – is at best irrelevant, but typically distorts risk taking 
decisions. 
Although our model considers a risk-neutral investor only, we expect the results to remain 
qualitatively unchanged if risk-averse investors are taken into account. Compared to 
symmetric taxation, the basic incentives for risk taking induced by asymmetric taxation and 
limited liability are similar. Of course, the quantitative effects are different for risk-averse 
investors. However, it should be noted that symmetric taxation can increase risk taking 
compared to the pre-tax case under risk aversion
13. 
Our model is based on some ceteris paribus assumptions. For example, we assume the 
distribution of the rates of return to be independent of the liability parameter. Implicitly, this 
means that contractual partners of the investor are indifferent with respect to (or unaware of) 
whether the investor is subject to full liability. Alternatively, we could assume that the 
contractual partners adjust the terms to which they are willing to deal with the investor in 
accordance with the liability conditions. I.e., market participants would demand a risk 
premium in the case of limited liability. Of course, a risk premium would imply different 
market prices for investors with limited and full liability. 
The existence of a risk premium means that identical risk levels taken by different investors 
are economically different if the investors are subject to different liability parameters. This 
does not speak against our type of analysis. Rather, this insight points to difficulties in 
defining tax neutrality if more and more changes of market processes are considered. As a 
result, the problem of risk transfer to contractual partners as well as the question of tax 
shifting must currently be regarded as unsolved. In principle, risk shifting and tax shifting 
could be modelled within a general equilibrium model. However, this approach requires 
assumptions about the risk preferences of all market participants. For reasons of feasibility, 
we use a partial model which excludes these problems. 
                                                 
13 See Domar / Musgrave (1944).   26
In any case, accepting the risk premium argument would rather support our results concerning 
legal-form-tax-neutrality. If risk taking decisions under full and limited liability were 
economically different, differential taxation of different legal forms would not violate the 
principle of equitable taxation. 
As a further caveat, our model requires detailed information about the distributions of 
investments’ returns. Even among professional investors these distributions are known only in 
exceptional cases. Furthermore, the loss-offset- and liability parameters are investor-specific 
as well as investment-specific and cannot be directly observed from tax law or corporate law. 
Liability-induced risk shifting between market participants is unlikely to be observable, too. 
Hence, risk-taking-tax-neutrality should not be regarded as a realistic tax policy objective. At 
best, it can serve as a benchmark for revealing the allocative effects of fiscal policy. 
Therefore, our model serves as a starting point to analyze the interdependencies between 
limited liability and asymmetric taxation from a tax policy perspective.   27
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